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ABSTRACT
The cultural and social effect of the Renaissance Italian military engineer is profiled within this 
thesis. It encompasses their vocational careers concerning the fluctuations in individuality, print 
censorship, and uneasiness attached to patronage and marketability. Their work and reputation 
directly coincided with the demand for trace italienne from numerous Italian city-states and enti-
ties throughout the cinquecento. As knowledge spread throughout the Italian peninsula, the indi-
vidualistic demand for military engineers diminished, integrating their discipline with other pro-
fessions. As the demand for patronage intensified, fears of fraudulence and plagiarism existed 
among printers and fellow engineers. This apprehension directly contributed to a lack of printed 
fortification treatises throughout the cinquecento and was escalated by foreign interventions 
(Sack of Rome, 1527). This thesis aims to tackle these issues met by Italian military engineers.
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CHAPTER 1: HISTORIOGRAPHY 
 Late-15th century architects were recognized by Italian society as a profession that could 
be employed for different purposes. As gunpowder weapons displayed their explosive power 
across the European continent, the roles of the High Renaissance architect changed drastically.  
Architects were employed to become engineers within the military. This new role encompassed 
advanced skills in mathematics, architecture, and newly integrated scientific knowledge. Many 
architects adapted to these new components within the profession but the question remained 
whether one needed to rely more on mathematics or architectural skill to be hired. Magistrates 
and governments hired certain military engineers of trace italienne based on how they viewed 
the arts and recent threats brought by gunpowder warfare. One that valued scientific accuracy 
and engineering, as displayed through geometry ranges and parabola angles in cannon fire, hired 
a military engineer with more mathematical precision. One that desired bastions of monumental 
grandeur hired military engineers who could re-create spectacular designs with their architectural 
hands, instead of with their mind’s eye.1 The purpose of this thesis is to dissect the individualistic 
vocation of the Italian military engineer as he engaged societal and cultural influences within the 
late fifteenth and mid-sixteenth centuries. 
 As technological theories were recognized over the course of the late fifteenth century, 
military engineers spread new forms of transferred intelligence across Italian city-states and bor-
derlands. The undisputed point of origin for trace italienne2, which is fortification designs 
1
1 ! Christopher Duffy, Fire and Stone: The Science of Fortress Warfare 1660-1860, (Edison, NJ: 
Castle Books, 2006) and Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early Modern World 1494-1660 (London:
UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1979). Duffy looks at the measures involved in constructing a star-based bastion 
and gives the best information to decipher which approach a military engineer took to construct their safe havens.
2  The meaning of trace italienne will be further reflected upon within this introductory chapter. For this sec-
tion, trace italienne deals with star-based bastion fortifications that resisted gunpowder assaults and ballistic weap-
onry. This development greatly increased defense for walled cities, thus giving them an “offensive” advantage.
shaped around stars and other geometric angles, was conceived in mid-fifteenth century Italy and 
this knowledge dispersed as travelers, merchants, and invading armies approached the northern 
peninsula. The influence of trace italienne was viewed throughout multiple European city-states 
and countries but furthermore across the African, American, and Asian world spheres. This re-
search is possible thanks to historians like Geoffrey Parker, J.R. Hale, Jeremy Black, and Chris-
topher Duffy.3 The spread of trace italienne is hardly visible in early colonial North America. 
Except for sixteenth century Spain, hardly any colonizing European powers showed any direct 
cause to use this information in colonial North America until at least the mid-seventeenth cen-
tury. Due to the scope of this thesis, the examination of trace italienne within the North Ameri-
can colonies will be reserved for a later endeavor. The second chapter will focus on the Italian 
peninsula as various city-states interacted with military engineers.   
 Problems concerning print ownership, plagiarism, censorship, and vocational prestige 
within Italian society will be addressed in my third thesis chapter. Military engineers produced 
models of their findings within written manuscripts and treatises that were constantly being re-
formed. In many scenarios, the designs of such working theories did not properly translate into 
real-time structural building. I believe that this frustration contributed to a lack of printed sources 
seen during the first half of the cinquecento. Preliminary fortification models were rarely good 
enough to give to potential publishers. Constant reform directly conflicted with the need to gain 
prestige and societal recognition among peers and aristocratic elites. Military engineers needed 
their theories and works to be published to gain credit and economic wealth. Scenarios concern-
2
3  These military historians have integrated multiple aspects of historical research through their works. A 
world history emphasis has been adopted to their particular arguments. For example, Geoffrey Parker has displayed 
how trace italienne has been transferred to the Asian continent in The Military Revolution (1988). Jeremy Black has 
looked at how warfare changed over the course of the world in the early modern age in European Warfare in a 
Global Context, 1660-1815 (2007). These historians all try to involve non-European examples to their arguments of 
choice.
ing plagiarism and print censorship among military engineers will be questioned and brought to 
the forefront within the chapter. Printed treatises will be followed as they spanned the continental 
sphere and appeared in book fairs, like that in Frankfurt during the early modern era. 
 In summary, the points of this thesis will incorporate how the knowledge and intelligence 
of military engineering (whether mathematical, scientific, or both) was transferred and either ac-
cepted or rejected across Italian borderlines as new forms of warfare became apparent to multiple 
societies from the quattrocento to cinquecento. The individualism of the military engineer will be 
profiled as the demand for the vocation changed over the course of the sixteenth century. Issues 
concerning print ownership, censorship, and plagiarism among military engineers will finish out 
the thesis. All of these aspects will be incorporated into the thesis with the hopes of bringing new 
research and ideas about the profession and how trace italienne changed military engineers 
within the early modern era.
Over the past thirty years, military historians have written in new and inventive ways. 
The roles of individuals in warfare, like William the Conqueror, Napoleon Bonaparte, and Robert 
E. Lee have been written about for centuries but in the 1970s a new perspective was adapted. 
John Keegan’s The Face of Battle brought new light to how mentally tasking it was to be in-
volved in the military in the early modern period.4 His work created a new desire to examine the 
role of individual soldiers and how they experienced warfare mentally, physically, and emotion-
ally. Keegan’s work no longer represented large armies as mere calculated numbers on a page but 
rather as innovative and independent soldiers with unique challenges given to them by warfare. 
By focusing on the Battle of Agincourt (1415), Keegan brought attention to the new transitions in 
3
4  John Keegan, The Face of Battle, (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), 78-80.
the art of warfare. Scenarios are vividly envisioned as the English longbowmen experienced an-
ticipation and fear as the ground units of the French cavalry charged at their position. Victor 
Davis Hanson’s 1989 work, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece de-
scribed how individual citizens, like the Greek hoplite warrior, felt on the combat field.5 This 
new perspective for military history was different from that of Sir Charles Oman and his founda-
tional works on the Middle Ages and the sixteenth century. The status of the individual self in the 
military has emerged as one of the more innovative areas of research as of late. My thesis aims to 
follow the profession of the military engineer as his individual role transformed due to the de-
mand received from war-stricken Italian societies, to protect themselves from gunpowder siege 
weapons. The demand was individualistic at first, with magistrates hiring sole candidates for the 
job. As the cinquecento progressed, the demand was extended to other foreign professions, like 
military generals and astronomers, to complete structures of trace italienne. In pursuing such 
topics, certain debates within the field of military history and technology must be examined.
1.1. The Debate concerning the Trace Italienne and the “Military Revolution” 
 The point of origin for the heated historical discussion about trace italienne was con-
ceived within a larger debate that was coined by Michael Roberts in January 1955 as “The Mili-
tary Revolution.” This label came from his inaugural lecture in Belfast titled, “The Military 
Revolution, 1560-1660.”6 Over the past sixty years, military and social historians have professed 
to challenge Roberts’ thesis and have created successful careers in doing so. Issues concerning 
historical time frame, the size of armies, increased amounts of warfare, new technological de-
4
5  Victor Davis Hanson, The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece, (Berkeley, CA: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1989), xxiii-xxix.
6  Clifford J. Rogers ed., The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early 
Modern Europe, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 37.
signs, and most importantly, the invention of gunpowder have all been addressed and challenged 
by military historians Geoffrey Parker, Jeremy Black, David Eltis, Brian Downing, David Par-
rott, and John Lynn.7 Roberts claimed that warfare was revolutionized by the successful integra-
tion of gunpowder and therefore “created” a revolution in warfare tactics, strategy, and army 
size. Roberts’ influential pioneers for such drastic change lied within the Swedishsixteenth and 
seventeenth century minds of Maurice of Nassau and Gustavus Adolphus. The thesis remained 
unchallenged until Geoffrey Parker’s 1976 article, “The ‘Military Revolution, 1560-1660’-A 
Myth?” appeared in The Journal of Modern History. It directly challenged and refined Roberts’ 
thesis. The idea of army size was broadened by Parker and manifested with numerical evidence 
from the historical period. It was not until Parker’s 1988 masterpiece, The Military Revolution: 
Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800 that trace italienne became an essential 
part of the debate at large.8 Trace italienne was formulated, according to Parker, by the rise of 
gunpowder weapons in siegecraft. The major event that portrayed this drastic change in warfare 
was displayed through the French invasion of Italy by Charles VIII in 1494. Although the inva-
sion caused Italians such as Francesco Guicciardini and Niccolo Machiavelli to despise the tradi-
tional systems in place, Italy recognized that their defense technology needed to be reformed and 
successfully integrated into preexisting professions, like that of the architect, to withstand a real-
istic shot against gunpowder weaponry.
 The French invasion took the Italian peninsula by surprise and caused many city-states to 
evaluate their societal roles. Fortifications that had stood for decades, even centuries, fell in mere 
5
7  Works include David Eltis’ The Military Revolution in Sixteenth Century Europe (1995), Brian Downing’s 
The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe 
(1992), David Parrott’s "The Military revolution in Early Modern Europe" (1992), and John A. Lynn’s Feeding 
Mars: Logistics in Western Warfare from the Middle Ages to the Present (1993). 
8  Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-
1800, (Great Britain: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 10-13.
hours. The force of the siege weapons brought new threats to the art of warfare by changing how 
it was conducted and won. Sieges became more common, as shown by Geoffrey Parker in his 
examination of the Spanish Army of Flanders in the mid-sixteenth to early-seventeenth centuries. 
In The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659: The Logistics of Spanish Victory and 
Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars, Parker followed the strategy of early modern armies as they 
conducted more sieges against bastions than open-field warfare.9 No army did this better than the 
Army of Flanders. In conducting sieges, militaries integrated a stronger emphasis on new tactics 
involving defensive warfare. This transition is wonderfully constructed by Christopher Duffy in 
his two works on siege warfare and the science of bastion design. Duffy’s 1979 work, Siege War-
fare: The Fortress in the Early Modern World 1494-1660 and his 2006 Fire and Stone: The Sci-
ence of Fortress Warfare 1660-1860 enabled military historians to better understand the idea of 
how sieges were employed. These two works profiled military architects and engineers who 
brought trace italienne across the European continent and beyond. Duffy was seen by his con-
temporaries as a definitive authority on how siege warfare was conducted and it is within this 
research that one can further understand the profession and their powerful influence on govern-
ments and city-states within the early modern period.
1.2. Progress of Science/Technology within Historiography of Military History
 Within the context of the “military revolution” debate lies an emphasis on technology and 
science. This approach has recently brought new scholarship to the discipline, but more 
importantly, has enabled military historians to break out of their self-constructed “bugle and 
6
9  Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659: The Logistics of 
Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars, (London, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 10-13.
trumpet” persona.10 The ways in which the military has been transformed due to technological 
advances have been widely researched in multiple works by Michael Roberts, Geoffrey Parker, 
William Eamon, Brett D. Steele, Sir Charles Oman, and Jeremy Black.11 Historians William H. 
McNeill and J.R. Hale focused in the 1980s on how far technology shaped early modern culture 
with warfare. J.R. Hale’s Renaissance War Studies has become a foundational work in describing 
the angle bastion and the conspiracies surrounding the first inventors of trace italienne. The same 
work profiled the Tudor castle campaigns and showed its severe backwardness compared to Italy  
and the rest of sixteenth century Europe.12 The historical scholarship in the 1980s laid the foun-
dation for the integration of science and technology for historians in the early twenty-first cen-
tury. 
 In 1994, William Eamon wrote Science and the Secrets of Nature which focused upon the 
spread of scientific theories and secrets within early printed sources. Nature and its secrets were 
evident throughout Europe and this caused innovators like Leonardo da Vinci, Leon Battista Al-
berti, and Francis Bacon to expand upon scientific discoveries through printed treatises. Eamon’s 
work has questioned the evolution of science and technology as it was integrated to a mass audi-
ence through print.13 Brett D. Steele and Tamera Dorland presented in 2005 a collection of thir-
7
10  David A. Bell, “Casualty of War.” The New Republic (May 7, 2007): 16-17 and Justin Ewers. “Why Don’t 
Colleges Teach Military History?” U.S. News & World Report (April 3, 2008). 
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/2008/04/03/why-dont-colleges-teach-military-history.html.
Ewers and Bell both wrote articles that describe the changing nature of military history and how it has been ap-
proached the last twenty years. The old approach was referred by academics as “bugle and trumpet” history. 
11  Works include Michael Roberts’ The Military Revolution, 1560–1660 (Belfast, 1956), Geoffrey Parker’s 
The Military Revolution, 1500–1800: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West (1988), Sir Charles Oman’s A 
History of the Art of War in the Sixteenth Century (1937), Jeremy Black’s A Military Revolution?: Military Change 
and European Society, 1550–1800 (1991) and "Was There a Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe?" (2008), 
and William H. McNeill’s, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since AD 1000 (1982). All 
of these works are considered historical pioneers in the integration of military history and technology.
12  J.R. Hale, Renaissance War Studies, (London, UK: The Hambledon Press, 1983).
13 William Eamon, Science and the Secrets of Nature: Books of Secrets in Medieval and Early   
Modern Culture, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).
teen articles that gave a new scientific perspective to military history. Technology and science 
were brought to the forefront of military matters in The Heirs of Archimedes: Science and the Art 
of War through the Age of Enlightenment. Certain developments in early modern science are pro-
filed in this collection featuring Newtonian science, fortifications, the adoption and rejection of 
gunpowder weapons, the schools of artillery, and the art of war itself. Within this collective 
work, Kelly Devries focused on the early development of fortifications and how particular im-
provements in the designs of bastions further translated into trace italienne for multiple 
countries.14 An important work by Simon Pepper and Nicholas Adams named, Firearms and 
Fortifications: Military Architecture and Siege Warfare in Sixteenth-Century Siena brought the 
intelligence of trace italienne to war-torn Siena. The idea of scientific inquiry within design 
structures has been largely researched within the last ten years. My thesis aims to present how 
trace italienne was integrated within Italian societies as military engineering became more ac-
cepted and desperately desired in the early modern world. 
 With the integration of science and technology seen as a viable component of historical 
scholarship, more drastic and inventive work on military civilian professions, like the military 
engineer, can be explored. Jane Heine Barnett’s 2009 article, “Mathematics goes Ballistic: Ben-
jamin Robins, Leonhard Euler, and the Mathematical Education of Military Engineers” looks at 
how the profession of early modern military engineers was directed toward mathematics in their 
constructions.15 Also in 2009, Pascal Brioist wrote an article titled, “‘Familiar Demonstrations in 
Geometry’: French and Italian Engineers and Euclid in the Sixteenth Century” which follows the 
8
14  Brett D. Steele and Tamera Dorland, eds, The Heirs of Archimedes: Science and the Art of War 
through the Age of Enlightenment, (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2005), 37-39.
15  Jane Heine Barnett, “Mathematics goes Ballistic: Benjamin Robins, Leonhard Euler, and the 
Mathematical Education of Military Engineers,” BSHM Bulletin 24 (2009): 92-104.
early engineering school as they adapted to new geometric practices within the scientific realm.16 
Pamela O. Long has presented her stand on the evolution of the technical arts in 2001‘s Openess, 
Secrecy, Authorship: Technical Arts and the Culture of Knowledge from Antiquity to the 
Renaissance.17 The world of Renaissance print and authorship is tackled and successfully de-
fended through case studies including Vitruvius, Francesco di Giorgio, and Albrecht Dürer. All of 
these works focus upon the civilian aspects of the engineer and their basic composition within 
the early modern period. In 2010, Martha Pollak’s Cities at War in Early Modern Europe collec-
tively scopes early modern Europe as warfare evolved. One of her main sections includes several 
chapters on the conception of “The Geometry of Power,” in relation to the internal structures and 
designs of citadels and fortifications.18 It is implied in this section that grandeur structures and 
the individuals who live in them are considered powerful and aristocratic in nature. In addition, 
historian Horst de la Croix has pinpointed fortification literature produced in the early modern 
era within his article, “The Literature on Fortification in Renaissance Italy.” It examines the 
authorities who exemplified these new designs of war. These secondary works lay foundations 
for further research on how the military engineer affected the scope of warfare in the early mod-
ern period.
1.3. Conducting Research through Primary and Secondary Sources 
 The availability of sources for this thesis are abundant, especially concerning secondary 
sources. A large amount of the primary evidence about Italian fortifications and architectural en-
9
16  Pascal Brioist,“‘Familiar Demonstrations in Geometry’: French and Italian Engineers and 
Euclid in the Sixteenth Century,” History of Science xlvii (2009): 1-27.
17 Long, Pamela O., Openness, Secrecy, Authorship: Technical Arts and the Culture of Knowledge   
from Antiquity to the Renaissance, (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2001), 175.
18  Martha Pollak, Cities at War in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), 9-12.
gineering had been largely reprinted in London during the mid-17th century, which can be ac-
cessed through the digital database of Early English Books Online (EEBO). Some of these early 
modern documents have been directly taken from the United Provinces, France, and Italy but 
have been either translated by English printers or been left in their original language. Examples 
of this can be seen in Giacomo Barazzio da Vignola’s The Regular Architect: or the General 
Rule of the Five Orders of Architecture. This work was originally written by an Italian architect 
but was translated by an English Civil War era printer named Joseph Moxon. Numerous docu-
ments found in my bibliography have similar formats. Italian treatises are within LiberLiber, an 
online Italian collective database. Other databases like Museo Galileo and OPAC SBN were of 
great help. I found relevant documents and treatises within these databases. Additional primary 
source materials were found through the Calendar of State Papers, containing letters, pamphlets, 
and messages from multiple areas like Venice, Milan, London, and Spain. Within these docu-
ments exists evidence of trace italienne at its inception, dating to the early fifteenth century. The 
Medici Archives Project provides detailed accounts of architects and engineers who were hired 
under the Medici. Their constructions provide a great look into how knowledge was transferred 
from the military engineer to the Medici. Pictures, ground-plans, building materials, and draw-
ings brought physical insight into trace italienne designs. All of these databases contributed 
greatly to the thesis. 
 The use of secondary historiography encompasses Sir Charles Oman in the 1930s to most 
recent works by Deborah Howard, Matteo Valleriani, and Elisabeth Kieven. Despite such preva-
lent source material, several challenges appeared. The issue of language translation and revision 
was at the forefront. Italian works, like Guicciardini’s History of Italy, have been revised multi-
10
ple times and English printers are not strangers to the process. Sidney Alexander’s translation of 
Guicciardini’s classic (1969) referred to the original Italian works to adequately portray Guicci-
ardini’s image of Italy. Alexander explained in his introduction that Sir Geffrey Fenton and Aus-
tin Parke Goddard fell short of bringing a definitive translation due to lack of language knowl-
edge and use of pre-translated copies.19 This is a common occurrence within the history profes-
sion. 
 Another issue dealt with the scope of material and timeframe. My overall aim was to es-
tablish a connection between military engineers and knowledge transfer across the early modern 
world but there were limits to how far a Master’s thesis could encompass. Originally, my scope 
extended from Italy to the early Americas and showed how trace italienne was dispersed and es-
tablished within early-17th century North America. An in-depth study of how this knowledge 
passed to the Americas has not been specifically done in showing how the military engineer was 
involved in these engagements. I have redirected this part of the thesis for a later endeavor, hope-
fully given within a Ph.d. dissertation. Focusing on strictly Italian, French, Spanish, and English 
source documents will be at the forefront of this thesis. 
 The distribution and handling of printed treatises and manuscripts among military engi-
neers and the mass public caught my attention as well. Hand written letters and practical theories 
in engineering could be taken, printed, and distributed to a public audience. What about print 
censorship and the sanctity of “ideas” among professionals who strive to constantly improve 
their ground plans and structural theories concerning trace italienne? Did book fairs elevate a 
military engineer’s theories to higher authorities and elites or expose them to fraud? Was the 
11
19  Francesco Guicciardini, ed. & trans. Sidney Alexander, The History of Italy (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1969), xxv-xxviii.
competition among military engineers respectable or did contemporaries steal and copy theories 
and designs? Was there a gap in printed fortification sources from 1500 to 1550 because of in-
decisiveness in theoretical thinking, fear of being plagiarized among peers, or/and not wanting 
prestige and fame for mere doodling and scribbles of fortification structures on paper? Why was 
there a need to print fortification treatises and engineering manuscripts around 1570 as opposed 
to the 1520s, when the Italian peninsula was overrun by foreign monarchs, religious leaders, po-
litical magistrates, and wealthy patrons? These questions are pursued in the second and third 
chapters of my thesis.  
1.4. Method, Theory, and Thoughts 
 Handling primary sources requires diligence. My main problem arose in needing to cate-
gorize primary sources into workable evidence for the advancement of the thesis topic. The art of 
war has continued to be a popular enterprise among early modern writers, especially those from 
England during the Tudor reigns. Many of those documents hardly mentioned fortification de-
sign, military engineering, theories, and trace italienne, but it is mentioned nonetheless. Engi-
neers and their fortification projects are mentioned within some of the letters from the Calendar 
of State Papers but additional research must be applied to see if these men were employed mili-
tary engineers or recreational students of the practice. In dealing with fifteenth and sixteenth cen-
tury Italy, J.R. Hale realized in his chapter, “The Early Development of the Bastion: An Italian 
Chronology c. 1450-c. 1534,” that the sources available for such research were scarce and quite 
difficult to manage at times.20 The ultimate solution in dealing with this problem is to look at the 
detailed ground plans and drawings produced by architects and engineers. By looking at draw-
12
20  Hale, Renaissance War Studies, 4-5. 
ings, one can assess whether a military engineer was more knowledgable in architectural and/or 
scientific-mathematical intellect. It is very important to view the completed structure when look-
ing at these theoretical drawings. Since a trip to Italy would be inconceivable without proper 
funding, some of these bastions can be seen on the internet and in various forms of literature. The 
key to studying the military engineers of the Italian peninsula is to view how initial ground plans 
and methods were carried out successfully in a finite physical form.
 Additionally, military engineers probably kept their ground plans secretly away from 
enemies and peers so that weaknesses could not be perceived on particular bastions. I would like 
to venture that not all engineers were completely loyal to their respected employers/patrons and 
occasionally distributed classified information to their enemies for profit and prestige. Christo-
pher Duffy points out in Siege Warfare that many engineers chose to withhold knowledge of 
trace italienne to countries with mixed interests.21 With such valuable information, enemy forces 
could bring down bastions with ease by concentrating ammunition fire on a weak spot. I look 
into how difficult it was for Italian military architects to decipher and translate fortress designs 
among peers. It is equally interesting to find if non-Italian architects could construct trace itali-
enne without the proper schooling and humanistic instruction from Italian universities. If the 
proper evidence can be taken from primary sources, I will proceed with this component of the 
military engineer in this thesis or some future project. 
 This study has revolutionized my vision of how military history should be perceived. To-
gether with studies in science and technology, military historiography can be successfully written 
in new perspectives. My goal is to add to this scholarship in furthermore directing my efforts to 
13
21  Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare, 40-42.
understand the societal challenges and promises attached to Italian military engineers. By focus-
ing on this profession, a wider and more complex world appears. A world which holds individu-
als who can change the thoughts of higher entities through intellectual knowledge and skills un-
known to most men throughout early modern society. This world produces men who can balance 
defense against attack.
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CHAPTER 2: MEN WHO COULD BALANCE DEFENSE AGAINST ATTACK: HIGH 
RENAISSANCE MILITARY ENGINEERS AND THE RECEPTION OF FORTIFICA-
TIONS THROUGHOUT THE ITALIAN PENINSULA
 The engineer of the High Renaissance endured drastic social and cultural changes to their 
profession. The powerful display of siege gun weapons at the end of the quattrocento caused Ital-
ian military establishments to desperately reform their warfare strategies. This threat made total 
victory, in a sense, a more impossible task to accomplish.22 As artillery weapons destroyed Ital-
ian castles and walls during the chaotic days of 1494, the importance of defending strongholds 
and cities became a desperate fight for survival. A new warfare strategy emerged from the intel-
lectual minds of Italian military engineers during the cinquecento. Early modern military engi-
neers revolutionized their architectural foundation into an advanced and practical intelligence 
called trace italienne, known as the construction of star-based fortifications and bastions.23 The 
engineer’s desire to endorse trace italienne became more individualistic in nature as numerous 
Italian city-states sought them out. Faced with imminent destruction, these political entities either 
accepted or rejected the advice of military engineers, resulting in potential employment. Magis-
trates and aristocrats based their interpretations on how beneficial trace italienne was to their 
16
22  Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road 1567-1659: The Logistics of 
Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars (London, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 5. Parker 
strongly makes the point that, “it became almost impossible to win a land war quickly” within the age of gunpowder 
siege weapons (15th-17th centuries).
23  It must be noted that the construction of angle bastions and star-based fortifications was not called trace 
italienne during the Renaissance and the sixteenth century. The adoption of the name trace italienne came from his-
torians of the “military revolution,” namely Michael Roberts, Geoffrey Parker, and many other theorists. See Geof-
frey Parker’s The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West 1500-1800 (Great Britain: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1988), 1-44. The word trace means “ground-plan” in French and italienne refers to the Ital-
ians. It is the French, under Vauban in the mid-seventeenth century, that fully adopted the name of trace italienne. 
Military historians of the mid-twentieth century adopted this name to describe the style and knowledge that the Ital-
ians invented in the mid-fifteenth century. For this chapter, and in further work on this topic, trace italienne will be 
used with this understanding in mind. For a more detailed explanation of the meaning of trace italienne see Mahin-
der S. Kingra,“The Trace Italienne and the Military Revolution During the Eighty Years’ War, 1567-1648,” Journal 
of Military History 57, no.3 (June 1993): 431-446.
particular culture and society. The intellectual reasoning and responses behind such scenarios 
will be addressed through case studies featuring Florence, Bologna, Rome, and Palmanova. The 
profession of the military engineer was individually responsible for spreading the new style of 
fortification design across these city-states and beyond the Italian peninsula. The education sur-
rounding trace italienne created a new strata among Italian societies in labeling military engi-
neers as “members of a cultural aristocracy.”24 As more city-states accepted the ideas of trace 
italienne, a deeper appreciation was given to the military engineer. That recognition was mar-
ginalized by Italian magistrates and governments by the end of the cinquecento. The role of the 
military engineer was amalgamated into a larger administrative system which consisted of pro-
fessions that were not fit for the task of implementing trace italienne. Nevertheless, a new face 
of military engineering was acknowledged despite its altered nature. The evolution of such a pro-
fession will be documented throughout this chapter.
2.1. The Identity of the Military Engineer 
! Italian architectural disciplines in the High Renaissance underwent a transformation as 
siegecraft decimated existing structures into mere rubble. The first generations of military engi-
neers during the quattrocento emerged as individuals who had knowledge and/or experience in 
multiple occupations. There were not many clear distinctions between architects and engineers 
during the early years of the Renaissance. Horst de la Croix complements this by stating that, “It 
should be remembered, however, that the Renaissance did not recognize so strict a separation of 
concepts and that, at that time, the terms ‘art’ and ‘science’ were practically interchangeable.”25 
17
24  Pascal Brioist,“‘Familiar Demonstrations in Geometry’: French and Italian Engineers and 
Euclid in the Sixteenth Century,” History of Science xlvii (2009):17.
25  Horst de la Croix, “Military Architecture and the Radial City Plan in Sixteenth Century Italy,” The Art Bul-
letin 42, No. 4 (Dec., 1960): 264.
Artists, painters, sculptors, mathematicians, musicians, humanists, and architects were all in-
volved in reformulating Italian pre-existing systems to further benefit the Italian peninsula 
against siege weapons.26 Each profession listed above was able to contribute in some way toward 
the disperse of trace italienne across the Italian peninsula. Italian architects contributed signifi-
cantly to this progression against siege warfare. The architect, according to Christopher Duffy, 
was considered a “jack-of-all-trades” individual.27 Naturally, the architect adapted into the role of 
the military engineer. The architect was highly trained in architectural design, whether in civil or 
military architecture. When the French invasion of Italy took place in 1494, Italian architects 
concentrated more on the practical components of military architectural design. More employ-
able architects attained conceptual wisdom in geometrical mathematics, and other forms of theo-
retical knowledge. Italian societies demanded and fabricated an engineering profession for their 
own benefit. Therefore, to be considered an effective and resourceful military engineer from the 
late-15th century to the cinquecento, a candidate had to procure a commanding grasp of theoreti-
cal (mathematical) and practical (military) knowledge. Pascal Brioist states:
that the suspicion of being a mere scholar could jeopardize your credit. War had become a huge 
industry by the end of the sixteenth century, engineers had no difficulty in finding  employment 
and their experience on the ground was important: they were both practitioners and theoreticians. 
Gentlemen themselves were highly trained and it was considered a shame not to be knowledge-
able in mathematics. There was no room left for amateur geometers or architects.28
Military engineering received its base of knowledge from the school of architecture. As military 
engagements intensified after 1494, the profession split into clear and distinct disciplines. Before 
Charles VIII established himself as ruler of Naples, Italian architects mostly produced civil pro-
18
26  Horst de la Croix, Military Considerations in City Planning: Fortifications (New York: George Braziller, 
Inc. 1972), 41.
27  Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early Modern World 1494-1660 (London:
UK: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1979), 40.
28  Brioist, 19.
jects in constructing cathedrals, palaces, taverns, monuments, and numerous other structures of 
architectural design. Once the ruinous force of gunpowder was witnessed by multiple Italian 
chroniclers at the fortresses of Ostia, Serezana, and Pisa, the social and political intentions of 
Italian city-states radically transformed.29 Francesco Guicciardini infamously accounted in his 
History of Italy the destructive nature of the French siege trains as they tested their new iron balls 
upon the enceinte of Italy.30 As noted by J.R. Hale, “Radical changes in fortification only take 
place when there is a radical change in offensive weapons.”31 These experiences created a new 
intellectual desire for defense and military engineers fulfilled such aspirations. 
 Horst de la Croix stated that, “only toward the middle of the sixteenth century did indica-
tions appear of a breakup in the field of human knowledge and a segmentation of its rapidly 
growing bulk into a number of separate departments. In the field of architecture, this trend was 
expressed by the emergence of military engineering as a profession distinct from that of civilian 
architecture.”32 Few within the profession looked at civil architecture as discrete and irrelevant 
due to its decorative nature in design. Giovan Battista Bellucci (1506-1554) ridiculed his con-
temporaries that implemented civil architecture within their practice.33 Despite Bellucci’s discon-
tent, two of the most influential sixteenth century Papal engineers, Michele di Sanmicheli and 
Antonio da Sangallo the Younger, both practiced civil and military architecture. On the Fortezza 
da Basso in Florence, Antonio da Sangallo the Younger applied his decorative knowledge of 
19
29  Francesco Guicciardini, History of Italy, I, 53, 58. Hans Delbruck writes in the fourth volume of his History 
of the Art of War how the casting of iron affected the overall impact of the cannonball. Hans Delbruck, The Dawn of 
Modern Warfare: History of the Art of War-Volume IV, trans. from German by Walter J. Renfroe Jr. (Lincoln, Ne-
braska: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 33-35.
30  Enceinte is another word for “walls,” which was mentioned by numerous French fortification chroniclers 
during the early modern period.
31  J.R. Hale, Renaissance War Studies (London, UK: The Hambledon Press, 1983), 6.
32  de la Croix, “Military Architecture,” 264.
33  Ibid., 274.
civilian architecture to the sides of his gates and towers with distinct styles.34 Architects who 
gained knowledge in both sub-fields were hired with open arms by multiple patrons, aristocrats, 
and court officials. It was not until the mid-sixteenth century when military engineers began to 
entirely dismiss civil architecture from its main school of knowledge.35 
2.2. Italian Views on Fortification and Defense  
! Military engineers were hired fervently throughout the cinquecento. Although the ideal 
for the engineering role was highly trained Italian architects, some magistrates and patrons from 
the peninsula did not feel the need to expend such extravagant resources. The research of Bert S. 
Hall indicated that, “new fortifications were enough to make even the most ruthlessly bellicose 
rulers flinch.”36 Niccolo Machiavelli was a key philosophical figure in spreading the notion that 
new fortifications and designs were simply unnecessary and costly in the early-sixteenth century. 
In Book VII of the Arte della Guerra and Book II of Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli shared pas-
sionately that, “no wall, no matter how great,” will be able to keep foreign gunpowder cannons at 
bay.37 In declaring such statements, employable military engineers were perceived as utterly use-
less and dispensable to Machiavelli. Machiavelli found no purpose in city-states hiring engineers 
to create unstable structures at immense cost. According to Allan H. Gilbert, Machiavelli stayed 
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34  Ibid., 273. J.R. Hale’s “The End of Florentine Liberty: The Fortezza da Basso” describes the development 
and organization of the Medici-inspired citadel Fortezza da Basso in his Renaissance War Studies (1983). In this 
chapter, Hale describes the growing animosity that the Florentines expressed toward the Medici and the engineers 
that were apart of the project. The attitude of the Florentines was largely in disagreement when they implied that 
citadels are for tyrants and walls for a free people. For further information, see Hale, Renaissance War Studies, quote 
on 32, 31-62.
35  Ibid., 273. In perceiving this clash between civil and military architecture, see Roland Freart’s A Parallel of 
the Ancient Architecture with the Modern.London: 1664. Obvious transformations within the school of architecture 
can be seen in detailed drawings of pillars, gateways, and roofs in Freart’s manuscript. 
36  Hall, Bert S., Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe: Gunpowder, Technology, and Tactics 
(Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 1997), 104.
37 Allan H. Gilbert, “Machiavelli on Fire Weapons,” Italica 23, No. 4 (Dec., 1946): 281. This article uses mul-
tiple quotes and citations from two of Niccolo Machiavelli’s works, The Art of War and Discourses on Livy. These 
works are the best sources in revealing Machiavelli’s views on fortifications and artillery. 
true to his statements until a year before his death. Gilbert recalled Machiavelli being cordially 
invited by Pietro Navarro and other military engineers to view the newly constructed enceinte 
surrounding Florence in 1526.38 Up to this point in Machiavelli’s lifetime, trace italienne had 
taken precedence across the Italian peninsula. After intently viewing the walls, Machiavelli 
seemed to accept that trace italienne was advancing after all. Gilbert emphasized that this new 
revelation was not adequately revised in Machiavelli’s works due to his death the following 
year.39 
 Machiavelli’s openness to fortification tours, especially within his native city of Florence, 
presents a concrete example of the impact of trace italienne. The theoretical and practical work 
of the military engineer was infectious as it changed the overall perspectives of Italian city-
states. The hiring of military engineers directly swayed particular entities, whether that be in so-
cial, political, or cultural interests. Certain conditions had to exist in order for military engineers 
to become influential in a given area of the Italian peninsula. John A. Lynn wrote that:
For fortifications to multiply, the area in question must be populated by the cities, or at least large 
towns, that required fortifications. And the walled cities had to be rich enough to contribute sub-
stantially to the construction of their modern defenses. Even then, it would be foolish to invest in 
fortifications were the area not strategically open to repeated attack.40
Threatened urban cities and fortresses were given higher priority than those, for example, posi-
tioned in undesirable locations. Charles VIII’s Naples campaign in 1494 was considered in many 
ways a bona fide invasion. Late-sixteenth century Naples was positioned geographically in 
21
38  Ibid., 281.
39  Ibid., 284-285. In the chapter “To fortify or not to fortify? Machiavelli’s contribution to a Renaissance de-
bate,” J.R. Hale writes about Machiavelli’s views concerning fortification based upon his knowledge of the Pisa and 
Padua sieges in 1509. Like Gilbert, Hale concludes that the experiences of Pietro Navarro did influence Machiavelli 
into having a more favorable view of trace italienne in the late 1520s. For more information, see Hale, Renaissance 
War Studies, pgs: 189-209.
40  John A. Lynn, “The Trace Italienne and the Growth of Armies: The French Case,” The Journal of Military 
History 55, No. 3 (Jul., 1991): 320. The italicized words are of my doing and not in the original article.
southern Italy and the only way for France to conquer Naples without naval intervention was to 
push militarily on foot through the fractured city-states of Milan, Florence, and Siena. This was 
disconcerting, but Charles VIII’s infatuation to acquire Naples drove his ambitions.41 The French 
navigated through the Italian peninsula with minuscule resistance but it was evident that the re-
invention of the siege craft helped redefine the art of defensive warfare for Italians. 
 Risky decisions were made concerning trace italienne. As mentioned before, architects 
were recruited and hired as military engineers for Italian city-states. The architectural works of 
Francesco di Giorgio Martini (1439-1501) were viewed by many of his contemporaries as the 
ideal model for constructing trace italienne.42 Giorgio Martini’s styles incorporated the triangular 
bastion that fired from numerous angles when faced with an offensive struggle. Although bas-
tions were not conceived by Giorgio, angular reinventions of similar bastion designs appeared in 
mid-fifteenth century drawings but did not emerge in many printed treatises until about one hun-
dred years later.43 The lack of published works on fortifications illustrated the changing nature of 
trace italienne. Constant modifications were applied to existing structures and ground plans were 
scratched continuously. The expenditure to print such treatises was exceptionally high and many 
military engineers did not want to publish until their theoretical ideology was truly represented 
through physical structures. From 1492 to 1570, only nine works on fortifications were published 
22
41  Guicciardini, History of Italy, Book I, 34-43. Charles VIII was urged by multiple individuals to take 
Naples, even though it was not beneficial for himself to do so. One of those men was Ludovico Sforza, the Duke of 
Milan. His claim to Milan was being challenged, thus Sforza let Charles VIII pass unscathed into Italy to solidify his 
right to the Duchy of Milan. Over time, Charles VIII idealized his passage into Naples as a “birthright” of sorts. 
42  Michael S. Dechert, “Military Architecture of Francesco di Giorgio in Southern Italy,” Journal of 
the Society of Architectural Historians 49, no. 2 (June 1990): 161-162.
43  Horst de la Croix, “The Literature on Fortification in Renaissance Italy,” Technology and 
Culture 4, no.1 (Winter 1963): 34-38. 
in Venice. This is a startling discovery when considering that Venice accounted for more than 
half of the total published military works during this period.44 
2.3. Case Study I: The Defense of Florence under Michelangelo 
! Due to the conglomeration of Renaissance disciplines, numerous employed military en-
gineers retained skills outside of architectural schooling. One of the most criticized but gloried 
personas that contributed to Florentine continental defense was the architect Michelangelo. The 
employment of Michelangelo in 1528-29 by the Florentine Republic was considered impetuous 
and reckless by numerous Italian military engineers. The skills that Michelangelo possessed were 
considered humanistic by the mass populace and his architectural works were centered in paint-
ing and sculpting. His interest in fortifications was not viewed seriously by other engineers. The 
engineering profession was known among Florentine civilians as “a gentleman’s education” in 
which the schools of architecture and humanist thinking intertwined successfully.45 Michelangelo 
showed consistency in the art of mathematics but his ability to physically construct fortification 
designs caused many to question the motives of the Florentine government. According to Wil-
liam E. Wallace, the Florentine Republic made the right choice to hire Michelangelo during their 
greatest time of need.46 
 Despite Michelangelo’s lack of engineering experience and skill, the Florentines experi-
enced drastic changes due to the threat of siege warfare in the early sixteenth century. Rome was 
23
44  J.R. Hale, Renaissance War Studies, 429-430. This information was found in Hale’s chapter, “Printing and 
Military Culture of Renaissance Venice.” Additional published works are mentioned that deal with the art of war, 
artillery, chivalry, military character, military medicine, etc. All together there were 67 published works on warfare 
during 1492-1570 in Venice. There were hardly half that number of published military works throughout the rest of 
early modern Italy. For more information, see Hale, Renaissance, 429-470.
45  Duffy, Siege Warfare, 4. 
46  William E. Wallace, “‘Dal disegno allo spazio’: Michelangelo’s Drawing for the Fortifications of 
Florence,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 46, no.2 (June 1987): 120.
sacked on 6 May 1527 by the Imperial army and the Medici were cast out of Florence to live as 
“rebels.”47 When it came to military defense, the loyalty of native Florentines was considered 
essential over foreign prospects. In a time of betrayal, the Florentine Republic looked for possi-
ble military engineers to help refortify the enceinte and towers around the city. A passionate and 
loyal native of Florence, Michelangelo considered himself knowledgable to take on the work the 
city demanded. It would had been better to take any other military engineer than Michelangelo 
during the later years of the 1520s. More qualified engineers and artisans like Michel di San-
micheli, Antonio da Sangallo the Younger, and Giovanni Battista Bellucci could had been hired 
instead of Michelangelo.The issue of protecting Florence with trace italienne was a highly de-
manding and tense situation for the republican officials and politicians. The amount of ducats to 
launch such a defensive endeavor were vehemently high and the candidate had to prove himself 
more than adequate to take on the project at hand. Nonetheless, Michelangelo proved through 
intense administrative meetings that he was ideal for the engineering job. Florence accepted alle-
giance over skill, in this scenario, in electing Michelangelo to the Nova della Milizia in January 
1529 and employed him in April as the Governor and Procurator General of the defense of 
Florence.48 The evidence for such confidence in Michelangelo was found within his creative and 
mathematical drawings on fortifications.49 They are not as detailed as that of Antonio da Sangallo 
24
47  Calendar of State Papers: Venice, 23 May 1527. Sanuto Diaries, v. xlv. p. 193, 114. Venice did not receive 
news of the sack until fifteen days afterwards, according to these state papers. It is noted that the Charles V’s com-
manding general, the Duke of Bourbon, was killed while taking the Imperial army into Rome. An account of the 
sack of Rome is detailed in Guicciardini, Book XVIII, 376-378. 
48  Wallace, 119. The Nova della Milizia was a committee that organized and tackled the military affairs of the 
Florentine city-state. According to Wallace, this committee was responsible for repairing the “walls and towers, to 
construct bastions, and finally, to fortify when and whenever it appears necessary.” The man chosen for this task was 
Michelangelo in January 1529.
49  Ibid., 121. These twenty drawings are preserved in the Casa Buonarroti and are considered by William E. 
Wallace as evidence for his role as a military engineer in the early sixteenth century. J.R. Hale also shows his appre-
ciation for Michelangelo as a military engineer in his chapter, “The Early Development of the Bastion: An Italian 
Chronology c. 1450-1534,” 25-27.
the Younger or Francesco da Giorgio Martini but do contain theoretical and practical insights. 
Michelangelo’s drawings are viewed as premature and of leisure, but nonetheless, indicate the 
characteristics of a military engineer.50 Michelangelo’s drawings were presented to the Nova 
della Milizia and they were successfully evaluated for further practice.51 Michelangelo’s stint as 
Florence’s military engineer proved the melding of the profession. The new role of the military 
engineer encompassed multiple occupations, disciplines, and fields that contributed to the grow-
ing nature of trace italienne across the Italian peninsula. 
 Even though great militaristic strides were seen through Michelangelo’s fortifications, 
Florence experienced the force of the Imperial army in artillery sieges conducted by the Spanish 
monarch Charles V in 1527. In a desperate and exhaustive quest for land acquisition, Charles V 
conquered numerous Italian city-states in the 1520s-30s. The Italian peninsula was regarded by 
Charles V as a battleground for aristocratic conquest. With Rome sacked by Charles V’s com-
manding general, the Duke of Bourbon, Florence became a desirable target for further aggression 
in the late 1520s. Michelangelo’s engineering efforts were not efficient enough for Florence, as it 
was taken by foreign opposition in 1529. To be fair to Michelangelo, his time as the chief mili-
tary engineer of Florence lasted less than a year; hardly enough time to adequately prepare Flor-
ence for mass invasion. Falling to foreign adversaries, the Florentine Republic faced multiple 
problems. To return the Medici to Florence, Pope Clement VII successfully allied himself with 
Charles V to conquer Florence. The Medici installed themselves again as powerful representative 
25
50  A database of Michelangelo’s fortification drawings can be viewed at: 
http://lebbeuswoods.wordpress.com/2012/05/22/michelangelos-war/. This entry is entitled, “Michelangelo’s War,” 
(22 May, 2012).
51  Ibid., 132.
of Florence, despite their unpopularity among the mass populace. The successful siege of Flor-
ence established Charles V in February 1530 as the next Holy Roman Emperor.52  
2.4. Case Study II: Bologna and the Rejection of Trace Italienne 
! The Papal ceremony was performed by Pope Clement VII in Bologna, which according 
to Guicciardini, was “the principal and most important city, excepting Rome, of the whole Eccle-
siastical State.”53 The importance and sanctity of Bologna is unique in its correlation to military 
engineering. Despite the growing influence of trace italienne across the peninsula, some Italian 
city-states generally disagreed on how to defend their strongholds against siege weapons.54 The 
city-state of Bologna directly refused to integrate a defensive plan that brought military engi-
neers within its gates. On multiple occasions, sixteenth century Bolognese aristocrats and magis-
trates were convinced that refortifying their walls was not the solution to the siege problem. 
Their beliefs coincided with the Greek and Spartan ideals of the “citizen soldier.” The townspeo-
ple of Bologna considered the adoption of defensive walls as a reflection of cowardice and 
weakness upon their sole identity. If war came to their gates, Bologna would equip its mass 
populace with weapons and shields to defend themselves.55 Their collective army was exces-
sively devoted to the cause of protecting its walls, but not in hiring military engineers to build 
26
52  Guicciardini, Book XVIII, 422-24, 426.
53  Richard J. Tuttle, “Against Fortifications: The Defense of Renaissance Bologna,” Journal of the Society of 
Architectural Historians 41, No. 3 (Oct., 1982): 191.
54 Due to the length of this chapter, other disagreements against trace italienne and military engineers will be 
mentioned in this footnote. In June 1509, the citizens of Treviso issued mass rebellions to illustrate their displeasure 
of the hired military engineer Fra Giovanni Giocondo. His ground plans required the razing of all buildings and 
property within five hundred meters of the tentative defensive fortress. The citizens of Treviso were denied their 
rights and the construction was completed in November 1509. A similar instance took place twenty-five years later 
on Florentine soil. The Medici proposal of a citadel (Fortezza da Basso) was largely refuted by the citizens of Flor-
ence. In essence, the Florentine’s status as people of a “free city” was in jeopardy. The construction of a citadel, ac-
cording to Gianotti, was “evidence that a republic was being challenged by a tyranny.” For documentation of these 
events see Croix, “Military Architecture,” 42-43 and Hale, “The End of Florentine Liberty,” 32.
55  Tuttle, 197.
fortifications. Early sixteenth century Bologna was a city-state that clenched its teeth against ar-
chitectural technology, when it was evident to other Italian political powers that siege warfare 
would fracture every entity within its path. 
 Throughout the cinquecento, Bologna stubbornly resisted refortifying its city. This is 
amazing knowing the nature of siege weapons during this century. The approach taken by the 
Bolognese was not favored by other Italian city-states. In 1526, Pope Clement VII sent two of his 
most highly trained military engineers, Antonio da Sangallo the Younger and Michele di San-
micheli, to investigate the fortifications surrounding the Pope’s beloved Bologna.56 With threats 
from the Spanish, French, Turks, and warring Italian city-states, Pope Clement VII formulated a 
campaign to successfully defend his Papal strongholds from siege warfare by hiring military en-
gineers skilled in trace italienne. The process of recruiting Papal military engineers was exten-
sive and difficult. Only the most skilled and adept engineers were hired by the Pope. Horst de la 
Croix points out that, “Along with and after Francesco di Giorgio, the greatest artist-architects 
were also the most sought-after military engineers of their time.”57 Rome was considered one of 
the most influential hubs of the High Renaissance and professional artists and architects were 
seen everywhere throughout the city. Their skills in geometry, architectural design, and econom-
ics brought them to the forefront of employment. Of all the military engineers that were hired by 
Pope Clement VII, Antonio da Sangallo the Younger and Michele di Sanmicheli were supreme.
 Sangallo the Younger and Sanmicheli arrived to find Bologna in dire need of refortifica-
tion. Sangallo drew two sheet drawings that required Bologna to invest in numerous bastions 
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across the city.58 The Bologna government body remained adamant, refusing to fortify its walls 
on account of its devout and armed citizenry. Richard J. Tuttle remarked that it was:
likely that the Duke of Bourbon bypassed Bologna because it could not be taken quickly. 
The city was defended by a force of Swiss guards, papal troops, and armed citizens-perhaps as 
many as 10,000 strong. A protracted siege was out of the question because it would have jeopard-
ized plans to take Rome. When Bologna was defensively united, size became its greatest asset. 
Francesco di Marchi affirms this fact when, in a list of natural urban defenses, he wrote, ‘Some 
cities are strong for having a great and armed populace, like the famous city of Bologna.’
Bologna was regarded as a naive city that could not defend itself militaristically. Even though 
Sangallo had drawn these plans, time was not on Bologna’s side. The Imperial army of the Duke 
of Bourbon ravaged the Italian peninsula and by the time of Sangallo’s visit, the Imperial army 
was only months away from Bologna’s borders. The resources and labor needed for such engi-
neering projects were insurmountable and therefore time became irrelevant in the wake of poten-
tial invasion. Nonetheless, Bologna was able to choose how they wanted to defend themselves 
against siege weapons. Bologna’s firm stance directly challenged the Pope and the advice of his 
military engineers. The city was beloved by Pope Clement VII but the city decided to deny such 
counsel from the Pope. Nevertheless, as Francesco di Marchi mentioned above, Bologna stayed 
true to their strategies and was unified in the face of preeminent destruction from siege warfare. 
 In Bologna’s favor, the Imperial army decided to sack Rome in 1527. In 1530, an alliance 
was manufactured with the Pope and Charles V, which solidified Bologna’s protection from the 
Spanish army and the Holy Roman Empire. With new popes elected, new agendas arose in con-
cern to military engineering and national defense. Pope Pius IV, who ruled the Papacy from 
1559-1565, pushed Clement VII’s inclinations to refortify Bologna in the 1560s.59 Throughout 
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the first half of the cinquecento, Bologna faced mass opposition from fellow Italian city-states 
for their decision not to implement trace italienne within their borders. Rome, Florence, Pisa, 
and multiple other cities fell to the gunpowder weapons of massive foreign armies, foreknowing 
that other aristocratic powers must realize the threat before them. In the early 1560s, the Ottoman 
Turks intensified their military presence across the Adriatic Sea and the lower half of the Italian 
Peninsula. With fear of being overcome by non-Catholic entities, the Pope raised a campaign to 
fortify the national defense of the Papal States. 
 In December 1561, Pope Pius IV sent his artillery commander Gabrio Serbelloni to inves-
tigate the fortifications of Bologna.60 Serbelloni was met with massive opposition from the citi-
zens of Bologna, according to Richard J. Tuttle, and his findings persuaded the Pope to send the 
Cortonese architect Francesco Laparelli to reinforce Serbelloni’s observations. Similar recom-
mendations are seen among the notes of Sangallo the Younger in the late 1520s and Laparelli’s in 
the early 1560s. The city did not endure siege warfare as other city-states had in the past. The 
basic composition of the city’s interior and exterior buildings were still intact but the need for 
fortification was advised highly by both military engineers. During the 1520s, Sangallo noticed 
the weakness of the enceinte and the need for refortification. Laparelli reemphasized Sangallo’s 
instructions in not only refortifying the enceinte but for Bologna to issue a “complete and mod-
ern refortification” of its city.61 In addition, both military engineers received harsh criticism and 
enmity from Bologna’s mass populace. Quoting Laparelli:
Although it has those citizens who with a mirror to the past and with pride in their forces believe 
that there is no need of other fortification, I say that they greatly deceive themselves because if 
an army should come from behind with a little artillery, one cannot defend the part below the 
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hills nor stop the breaching of the ditch in the first battle in that it will not be possible to defend 
another part."62
Even in the 1560s, Bologna continued to oppose military engineers and trace italienne. Florence, 
Siena, and other city-states had varied political and economic policies regarding military engi-
neering and regarded it beneficial to their existence, unlike Bologna. With this in mind, not all 
military engineers were able to administer their knowledge to all Italian city-states. In Bologna’s 
case, it is noteworthy that they used the influence and skills of the military engineer regardless. 
 To counterattack the Pope, Serbonelli, and Laparelli, Bologna hired a native military ex-
pert named Plinio Tomacelli. The Bolognese government and Tomacelli constructed a rebuttal 
titled, Discorso sopra la fortificatione di Bologna di messer Plinio Tomacelli sotto l'anno 1565.63 
According to Tuttle, Tomacelli’s Discourse had three main arguments against the Papal scenario 
for refortifications. The economical spending, the defense strategy of the Pope, and the use of 
Bologna’s military were all put forward as persuasive reasons for Bologna not to accept Papal 
intervention. The money needed was nonexistent and the trace plans of Sangallo and Laparelli 
were not realistic. The real military threat, according to Tomacelli, was from Naples and not from 
the Ottoman Turks. The Bolognese did not view the Turks as seriously as the Papal States did. 
The threat of Turkish invasion was a threat since the 1440s, as displayed through the hiring of 
Venetian architects to Ragusa in Sicily.64 Lastly, if war came from the Turks or Southern half of 
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the Italian peninsula, the citizens of Bologna would adopt the Machiavellian idea of mobilizing 
an army than have expensive enceinte.65 Tomacelli reassured Rome that, “if attacked by a large 
army there will be time enough to raise earthen ramparts, collect troops, and arm the citizenry.”66 
Despite the inconveniences from Bologna, Pope Pius IV passed away in December 1565 and was 
not able to directly challenge Tomacelli’s Discourse. Fortunately for Bologna, the newly elected 
Pope Pius V (1565-1572) drew away from internal national defense strategies. 
 Bologna represents a clear deviation from Florence in 1527-29. The powerful influence 
of the military engineer could persuade entire cities to adopt trace italienne. Their skills in ge-
ometry and masonry helped persuade magistrates to fortify themselves against the destructive 
force of siege weapons. The mass populace of Bologna showed that the influence of the military 
engineer could be rejected by “common” citizens and specialists from other professional occupa-
tions. Tomacelli was a military expert but did not have the engineering expertise of Sangallo the 
Younger, Laparelli, and even Michelangelo. Victories coaxed by non-specialists were more ap-
parent as the mid-sixteenth century progressed across the Italian peninsula. The knowledge of 
trace italienne was transmuted to military specialists, mechanics, humanist scholars, philoso-
phers, astrologers, musicians, and mathematicians. Therefore, a mixture of talented professions 
were required when fortifications projects were undertaken after the mid-sixteenth century. 
 Due to the lack of printed fortification treatises in the early sixteenth century, the percep-
tion of military engineering fell in importance and grandeur. The individualistic nature of the 
profession was criticized and undermined by those who professed to be a part of it. Not all mili-
tary engineers felt that their profession needed the help of other specialists to adequately take on 
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structural projects. Great engineers from the late-fifteenth to early sixteenth centuries like 
Francesco di Giorgio Martini, Antonio da Sangallo the Elder, and the Florentine Michelozzo di 
Bartolomeo considered their skills to be supreme and opposed the diffusion of other military and 
civilian experts.67 As the technology of trace italienne was witnessed in multiple bastions, en-
ceinte, and strongholds, certain military engineers began to form allegiances within their own 
profession. 
 New views emerged that contradicted the engineer’s overall individual role within engi-
neering projects. Giovan Battista Bellucci wrote in his Nova Invenzione (1554) that military en-
gineers ought to specialize in speculative and operative knowledge to be considered an elite 
among peers.68 A speculative master was to be both militaristic in nature and mindful of all 
things associated with siege weapons. An expert in operative knowledge had to be extremely 
cunning in mathematical precision and skill. Bellucci believed that one man could not encompass 
both these forms of knowledge. This predicament, according to Bellucci, could only be solved by 
having two specialists on a specific engineering project; one with speculative skill and the other 
in operative duties. The military soldier or general was the ideal candidate for attaining specula-
tive knowledge, while a skilled mason was to be in charge of all matters dealing with operative 
comprehension.69 Along with Bellucci’s argument concerning the elimination of civil architec-
ture in the field of military engineering, Antonio Lupicini commended the notion that all civil 
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architects should be under close supervision by a speculative official.70 In addition, Francesco di 
Marchi largely viewed the engineer having “a place in the building of fortresses, but only as one 
member of a group of experts and specialists."71 The individualism that the High Renaissance 
gave to men of such vocation started to diminish in importance.72
 It is intriguing that these military engineers had their treatises published posthumously 
around the last two decades of the sixteenth century. The desire for individual recognition and 
publicity was paramount for any profession. Plagiarism was highly suspected between military 
engineers and it was important for fortification ideas and models to be published in order to gain 
endorsements from patrons and magistrates across the Italian peninsula. It is noted that, “Particu-
larly within the ranks of military architects, the concept of intellectual property took a firm hold, 
as various engineers jealously tried to guard, or at least to reap recognition for, inventions which 
they claimed to have made."73 For some military engineers like Gabriello Busca, it was neces-
sary to talk about new theories and ideas among contemporaries.74 The idea of trace italienne 
became a widespread phenomenon but ownership over such an esteemed design ultimately 
caused military engineers to accuse contemporaries of plagiarism. Similar to the spread of hu-
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manism, the growing demand for trace italienne extended far beyond the peninsula to continen-
tal Europe, Asia, and the early Americas. This demand ignited a vicious battle for employability, 
which entitled Italians to become the masters of this new design in defensive fortifications. From 
the 1480s to late 1520s, military engineers were hired to take projects with an individualistic atti-
tude. Their skills were viewed as supreme and not performed by other professions. The economi-
cal profit for the military engineer was not shared by other specialists and was considered a de-
cent vocation of choice. This strata was eventually transmuted as print manufactures brought 
printed fortification treatises to a mass public after the 1550s. 
2.5. Case Study III: The End of Individualistic Military Engineers: Palmanova
! By the 1590s, Italian city-states did not hire individual military engineers as the sole rep-
resentatives in fortification projects. Italian officials, patrons, and aristocrats became well-versed 
in the components of military engineering and hired employees based upon how they valued the 
profession. Duke Emanuel Philbert of Savoy (1528-1580) educated himself by reading the trea-
tises of Leon Battista Alberti, Vitruvius, and Antonio da Sangallo the Younger. He hired groups 
of military engineers to construct trace italienne across Savoy and Piedmont. His notable em-
ployees were Giovan Maria Oligati from Genoa, the Milanese Gabriello Busca, and Francesco 
Paciotto da Urbino.75 At the 1534 conference in Rome, Pope Paul III invited numerous soldiers 
and military engineers to refortify Rome.76 It is important to mention that military soldiers were a 
direct part of this Papal meeting. Bellucci’s arguments concerning speculative and operative dis-
ciplines were apparent even before his treatise was written in 1554. Rome denied the idea of 
trace italienne throughout multiple conferences in the 1530s and was reminded constantly of the 
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economic implications of adopting such a defensive plan. Great engineers like Laparelli, San-
micheli, Castriotto, and Michelangelo tried to get the Pope to consider their trace plans but only 
Sangallo the Younger was able to construct one complete bastion at the cost of 44,000 ducats! It 
was perceived that, “The tremendous cost and time expended for this bastion's construction 
forced the Pope to realize that his original plan to fortify the entire city had been overly 
ambitious.”77 The Pope realized that one individual could not capture the spirit of trace italienne 
without help from other specialists.
 The ultimate engineering project which solidified the adoption of having a mass group of 
specialists was found in the grand design of Palmanova.78 Erected on the eastern frontier of the 
Venetian Republic in 1593, Palmanova’s construction was led by Marc’Antonio Barbaro. Bar-
baro changed the role of the individualistic military engineer by leading an engineering project 
with virtually no military and architectural experience or skill.79 Considered the Venetian “super-
intendent” of the Provveditori alle Fortezze in 1587, Barbaro investigated the Friuli with experi-
enced military engineers Giulio Savorgnan and Bonaiuto Lorini.80 It was decided that a fortezza 
reale should be constructed to prevent Turkish, German, or Austrian invasion. Military engineers 
hardly influenced the vote. A whole team of military experts, strategists, senators, ambassadors, 
advisors, councilors, civil architects, and military engineers agreed to construct Palmanova in 
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October 1593.81 The entire building process went through multiple disagreements and setbacks 
due to the plethora of opinions involved. Each contributing individual tried to get their certain 
agendas integrated into the Palmanova radial fortress. Military engineer Savorgnan and his assis-
tant Lorini were not able to adequately bring their trace plans to fruition because of these con-
flicts of interests. Marc’Antonio Barbaro told the Venetian senate that, “it is not enough to sur-
round the site with walls, but to arouse admiration you need inhabitants, industries, crafts, trades, 
and other provisions.”82 The civil and administrative demands of powerful individuals like Vin-
cenzo Scamozzi and Barbaro changed the military fortress of Palmanova into a habitable radial 
city.83 
 The mixture of different professions and skills turned Palmanova into a monument of 
civil engineering, rather than a structure that could withstand artillery fire.84 The voice of the 
military engineer was drowned out by more powerful individuals who had virtually no experi-
ence in the arts of trace italienne. Savorgnan’s model and command of Palmanova was disre-
garded during the early process years and a new ground plan was adopted and furthermore ap-
proved by the Venetian Senate.85 Barbaro was chosen to enforce the senate’s new plan for Pal-
manova. The construction of Palmanova was a definitive turning point for the military engineer. 
The military engineer was regarded as a profession that was never questioned for its skill and 
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method. Italian governments and administrative bodies no longer sensed the overwhelming de-
mand for military engineers once their knowledge became available through printed treatises. 
Nevertheless, the knowledge of trace italienne was spread across the Italian peninsula because of 
the early modern military engineer.  
2.6. In Conclusion: The Architect’s Wit
 Francesco di Giorgio Martini declared that, “The man who would be able to balance de-
fense against attack, would be more a god than a human being.”86 This Machiavellian idea was 
evident through the intellectual evolution of the military engineer from the 1480s to the early 
1590s. The city-states of the Italian peninsula endured the force of siege weapons in an age when 
the offense prevailed over defense. The reaction to such threats created the need for military en-
gineers, in which the best plan for survival was unravelled. A sense of aristocratic power was 
given to the military engineer when he chose to distribute his knowledge to Italian city-states. 
The fifteenth century humanist scholar Leon Battista Alberti was not premature in declaring that, 
“you would go near to find that most of the Victories were gained more by the Art and Skill of 
the Architects, than by the Conduct or Fortune of the Generals; and that the Enemy was oftener 
overcome and conquered by the Architect' s Wit.”87 It can be argued that the intellectual mind of 
the engineer was relished as more powerful and valuable than military generals from the High 
Renaissance to the middle of the cinquecento. The demand for the profession changed from 
within as well. Great military engineers were no longer sought out individually after such deba-
cles like the sack of Rome in 1527, the Bolognese rejection of trace italienne, and the neglect of 
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engineering counseling during the construction of Palmanova. The acceptance of social and intel-
lectual groups of multiple designs were widely accepted, thus killing the ideal of professional 
individualism during the High Renaissance. Trace italienne was disseminated by the military en-
gineering profession and its overall effect was contingent upon how societies in Italy principally 
absorbed the new knowledge into its societal framework.
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CHAPTER 3: CROWS DRESSED IN PEACOCK FEATHERS: PRINT CENSORSHIP 
AND APPREHENSION AMONG 16TH CENTURY ITALIAN MILITARY ENGINEERS
 Sixteenth century military engineers endured challenges in trying to keep their work se-
cure. As with all vocations that depend on print to establish a sense of prestige and credibility, 
unauthorized imitation presents as an extreme problem. In the early modern era, few military en-
gineers wanted a shared culture among peers as many feared the stealing of intellectual theories 
and designs. Gabriello Busca deemed it necessary to talk about new theories and ideas among his 
contemporaries.88 The idea of trace italienne was a widespread phenomenon, but ownership over 
such an esteemed design caused military engineers to accuse each other of plagiarism. Military 
engineers needed their theories and geometrical drawings to be printed to gain public credibility, 
vocational prestige, and economic wealth within Italian society. The desire for individual recog-
nition and publicity was paramount to achieve aristocratic and patron benefits. Strong competi-
tion created suspected fears of plagiarism between military engineers, with some denying the 
public benefits of patronage to keep their works away from charges of fraudulence. Horst de la 
Croix noted that, “Particularly within the ranks of military architects, the concept of intellectual 
property took a firm hold, as various engineers jealously tried to guard, or at least to reap recog-
nition for, inventions which they claimed to have made."89 This presumed and mysterious un-
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Culture 4, no.1 (Winter 1963): 43. Gabriello Busca was not alone in his agenda but contemporaries found it trou-
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letin 42, No. 4 (Dec., 1960): 275. This quotation was found within footnote 54.
easiness concerning fraudulence and print censorship among sixteenth century military engineers 
will be questioned and brought to the forefront in this chapter. Illicit
 To understand plagiarism during this era, one must look at the distribution and handling 
of Italian printed treatises and manuscripts among the mass public. Print was vibrant in the early 
cinquecento, especially in Venice and Padua, but as trace italienne spread throughout the Italian 
peninsula an evident lack of printed material dealing with fortification theory has been wit-
nessed. J.R. Hale and Horst de la Croix researched this gap concerning published fortification 
treatises and noticed that a dominant presence of fortification print was not seen until the last 
third of the cinquecento (1560-1598).90 Multiple reasons for the print gap will be investigated 
throughout this chapter. In the last decades of the quattrocento (1470-1500), Francesco di Gior-
gio produced treatises that concerned trace italienne within Trattato I and Trattato II.91 These 
two primary works were viewed as “guiding lights” for a profession that did not see extreme de-
mand until the French invasion of 1494. Other military engineers, including Francesco di Gior-
gio, looked to Vitruvius’ De architectura for foundational inspiration concerning architecture 
theorem. Written around 40 B.C, De architectura was printed and translated by numerous indi-
viduals like Giovanni Giocondo (1433-1515), Cesare Cesariano (1475-1543), and Francesco di 
Giorgio.92 Vitruvius’ De architectura, Leon Battista Alberti’s De re aedificatoria (1452), and 
Francesco di Giorgio’s Trattato I & II (late 1470s) laid the groundwork in fortification literature 
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during the first half of the cinquecento. Can historians be naive enough to claim that just these 
printed works provided the base for future work in trace italienne? Multiple reasons and ques-
tions surrounding the fortification print gap will be examined throughout this chapter. 
 Military engineers produced models of their geometrical findings within written letters, 
manuscripts and miscellaneous journals that were constantly being reformed. In many scenarios, 
the geometric drawings of such working theories did not properly translate into real-time struc-
tural fortifications. I believe that frustrations attached with editing contributed to a lack of 
printed fortification treatises seen during the first half of the cinquecento (1498-1558). Prelimi-
nary fortification models were rarely established enough to give to potential Italian publishers or 
editori.93 Therefore, many publishers and printers would not take a hit on their budget for the 
whims of engineers to pursue a wealthy patron. Constant reformulation and illicit reproduction of 
works directly conflicted with the need to gain prestige and societal recognition among peers and 
aristocratic elites.  
 The body of this chapter will address certain questions: What about print censorship and 
the sanctity of “ideas” among military engineers who strive to constantly improve their ground 
plans and structural theories concerning trace italienne? Did book fairs and conferences elevate a 
military engineers’ theories to patrons and elites or expose them to a mass populace that prac-
ticed fraud and counterfeiting? Was the competition among military engineers respectable or did 
contemporaries steal and copy theories and designs when made available? Was there a gap in 
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printed fortification sources from 1500 to 1550 because of indecisiveness in theoretical thinking, 
fear of being plagiarized among peers, or/and not wanting prestige and fame for mere doodling 
and scribbles of fortification structures on paper? Did the Sack of Rome of 1527 truly have any 
impact on the lack of print seen in the first half of the cinquecento? Why was there a need to 
print fortification treatises and engineering manuscripts in the 1570s to 1590s, as opposed to the 
1520s, when the Italian peninsula was overrun by foreign monarchs, religious leaders, political 
magistrates, and wealthy patrons?  Answers to these questions will be pursued.
3.1. The Need for Fortification Literature within Patronage and Print 
 Handwritten letters and practical theories in military engineering were taken, printed, and 
distributed to a public audience. After the 1494 French invasion, a growing need for fortification 
defense was seen among numerous aristocrats, patrons, and elites across the Italian peninsula. 
Similar to the spread of humanism, the growing demand for trace italienne extended far beyond 
the peninsula to Northern Europe, Asia, and the early Americas.94 This span sparked a vicious 
battle for employability and recognition, which enabled the Italians to become the masters of this 
new design in defensive fortifications. From the 1480s to late 1520s, military engineers were 
hired to take projects with an individualistic attitude, as referred to by Jacob Burckhardt.95 Their 
skills were viewed as supreme and not performable by other professions until the Venetian Pal-
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manova project in the early 1590s.96 Before Palmanova, the economical profit for the military 
engineer was not shared by other specialists and was considered a decent vocation of choice. 
This strata conglomerated as print manufactures brought printed fortification treatises to a mass 
public after the 1560s. 
 The struggle for patronage through print coincides with multiple vocations throughout the 
High Renaissance. Research on these endeavors has been profiled, but not within the confines of 
military engineering. Dealings with sixteenth and seventeenth century patronage have been men-
tioned in Mario Biagioli’s Galileo Courtier and Henri-Jean Martin’s Print, Power, and People in 
17th- Century France.97 To be more specific, numerous print and art historians have traced the 
evolution of print and patronage through relationships between sixteenth century musicians and 
printers.98 Iain Fenlon’s 1994 The Panizzi Lectures: Music, Print, and Culture in Early Sixteenth-
Century Italy follows the transformation of how written musical notes and staffs were displayed 
on printed manuscript paper and woodcuts. Fortunately for musicians, the market demand for 
musical manuscripts was high and printers hardly ever declined printing music.99 Military engi-
neers faced difficulties of a different nature throughout the cinquecento. Printed treatises of forti-
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fication theories and structures were not viewed favorably by printers and editors across the Ital-
ian peninsula. Geometrical designs constantly changed as bastions were being constructed and 
this caused numerous frustrations for printers who needed definitive material to print. It can be 
stated that engineers were “reluctant to go into print if they felt that a text was not yet in the fi-
nalized state which was required for reproduction on a wide scale.”100 The cost of paper was al-
ways set at a high rate and waste was unacceptable.101 Printers needed to produce material that 
could be replicated without refinement from military engineers. Musicians expected their work 
to be mass produced across Europe. Military engineers wanted this as well, but feared that their 
work could cause division and plagiarism among fellow artisans if given prematurely.
3.2. The Historiography of Print Culture and Its Importance 
 Jane A. Bernstein’s Print Culture and Music in 16th Century Venice fleshes out how mu-
sicians engaged European book fairs, publishing markets, and respected printers. I believe that 
the research conducted by Bernstein can be equally applied to that of the military engineer. Al-
though her book deals with sixteenth century musicians, the interactions and struggles of getting 
written works printed were pertinent for all artistic vocations of the High Renaissance.102 Influ-
ential conductors of print, like Girolamo Scotto and Antonio Gardano, worked around Venetian 
lawmakers, senators, and Holy Office officials to get treatises and manuscripts to the public 
sphere.103 These two publishers controlled just a few of the 150+ printing shops across the Vene-
tian landscape around the early 1500s.104 Bernstein proposes throughout her research that, 
“commerce played a crucial role in every aspect of music printing,” and in the “role of the entre-
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preneur.” She declares that print culture in Venice was a “business phenomenon.”105 Agreement 
with such a statement directly coincides with a larger argument made within a pioneering work 
written by Elizabeth L. Eisenstein. The two part volume, The Printing Press as an Agent of 
Change, marks the validity of the “advent of printing” as a critical and “most important event in 
the cultural history of mankind.”106 The desire for profit and wealth directly influenced military 
engineers to push publishers to print their treatises to gain recognition among elites and potential 
patrons. Did commerce influence the role of print and expand the system of patronage in the 
cinquecento? Absolutely. Comprehending this will help provide useful information on why anxi-
ety existed among this group of engineers as more works became available to the mass public. 
 To gain credibility among editori, military engineers had to develop and maintain rela-
tionships of shared interests. It must be realized that military engineers and printers methodically 
thought in different ways. Each had their own agendas with attached preconditions. J.R. Hale 
describes this relationship in saying that,“the printer thought in terms of the market, the author 
[engineer in this case] in terms of a patron.”107 Fame, dedicating treatises to a potential patron, a 
reputation for expertise, employment, stipends, and commerce were benefits of getting manu-
scripts printed for military engineers. The hopes and demands from printers culminated in having 
a respectable reputation among fellow printers, artisans, and elites, a dependable income to sup-
48
105  Bernstein, Print Culture, 4-5.
106  Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and  Cultural Trans-
formations in early-modern Europe Volumes I & II (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 167.
To say that this work is controversial is an understatement. Jean-Francois Gilmont points out that, “Eisenstein at-
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107  Hale, 432. Brackets are my own within the quotation. 
port their family, gaining patrons to pay for printing expenses in paper, ink, and second editions, 
and spreading literacy among the city-states of the Italian peninsula.108  Even though editori and 
military engineers had different goals, each had inclinations to gain the attention of patrons. Ul-
timately, the editori had control over the military engineers in this arena. Many engineers and 
artisans did not succumb to printers. Notable men like Alberti, Ghiberti, Copernicus, and Ma-
chiavelli, and Galileo either had intentions of printing their treatises themselves or delayed the 
printing of their works until their souls had left this world. Copernicus was not in a rush to pub-
lish his De Revolutionibus, therefore letting Rheticus publish his innovative yet controversial 
work on the universe.109 
 Galileo Galilei’s view on printing directly affected his early career within academia and 
the technical/scientific field. His work on the military compass, Operations of the Geometrical 
and Military Compass, was not published until 1606 by Marinelli, in Galileo’s forty-second year. 
Mario Biagioli notes that Galileo had been conducting mathematical work since 1587 but suf-
fered as a published author due to disputes with his fellow Paduan student Baldassare Capra.110 
Galileo was content to use manuscript copies of his work as he taught his students the military 
arts of fortification and mechanics at the University of Padua from 1592-1610. His fears on pla-
giarism, if any during the early years at Padua, were only noticeable when his students claimed 
work that was not theirs. Traditionally, like some military engineers, mathematical scientists 
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would communicate “their discoveries and theorems to other specialists through letters or per-
sonal visits.111 Galileo was paid decently for being a professor and did not fit the economic con-
structs of military engineers of the cinquecento. Engineers needed patrons for employability, but 
Galileo was employed at the universities at Padua and Pisa. Despite his economic situation, it 
can be seen that Galileo’s confrontation with Capra changed his nonchalant-views concerning 
printed material, plagiarism, and censorship. The control of intelligence was difficult, especially 
for the students within Galileo’s classrooms. Biagioli sees the Capra quarrel as methodically 
changing Galileo, viewing print as a means “to control, not to communicate.”112 Numerous mili-
tary engineers during the cinquecento saw print similarly, therefore seeing knowledge as a means 
to control Italian society. 
3.3. The Complicated Relationship between Printers and Military Engineers 
 Engineers had to have confidence and mutual respect for printers, knowing that giving 
their work to print could result in fraud, unauthorized duplication, and plagiarism if undermined. 
Editori, like Scotto and Giorgio Vasari, established relationships and connections with numerous 
employers, artisans, and patrons. Market demand and flow of money were influential agents in 
the world of print and it would not be a stretch to conclude that some printers probably chose to 
print more demanding pieces of literature to achieve wealth and recognition. This resulted in 
more recognizable engineers getting their works publicly printed before lesser known individu-
als. For example, a treatise by Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo would be more appealing to 
a mass public than one by Giovanni Battista Bellucci (1506-1554) in the early years of the 
cinquecento. As the century progressed, Bellucci and other engineers would get their chance at 
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patronage but after death. Bellucci’s Nuova invenzione di fabricare fortezze di varie forme...,was 
written before 1554 but not published until 1598 by Tommaso Baglioné, forty-four years after 
the author’s fatal meeting with fire weaponry.113 His works were echoed by Francesco di Marchi 
and Castriotto in the later years of the cinquecento, but the recognition he deserved was never 
credited to him while living. Another of his truly innovative works on earth centered fortifica-
tions, Trattato delle fortificazioni di terra (1554), was not published during the era of trace itali-
enne. Bellucci is just one of many military engineers that did not establish credentials with edi-
tori during the cinquecento. 
 To be fair, Horst de la Croix mentions that numerous grammatical and structural prob-
lems existed within Bellucci’s treatises and this may be the cause of why printed works by engi-
neers were not abundant among the mass populace. Ideally, works by military engineers were not 
the most favorable to print during the 1500s. They contained multiple artistic designs, numerical 
and geometrical figures, and prolonged explanations of how to decipher their particular ways of 
thinking. Giovanni Giocondo’s printed version of Vitruvius’ De architectura (1511) required one 
hundred and thirty-six of his own woodcuts to be printed.114 Additional hardships came with 
producing printed works of Vitruvius’ De architectura. Cesare Cesariano’s early-sixteenth cen-
tury printed translation of Vitruvius was halted by his sponsors Agostino Gallo and Aloisio Pi-
rova after disagreements, in which many details remain unknown. The sponsors stopped the sup-
posed publication of 1,300 copies by “intercepting” Cesariano’s materials and papers from 
him.115 Giacomo Barozzi da Vignola (1507-1573) recognized the financial toll of printing archi-
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tectural works during the cinquecento.116 To help eliminate confusion and prolonged explana-
tions of models, Vignola used numeracy instead. His drawings were explained through numbers 
and geometrical equations, thus cutting the amount of paper needed to print architectural trea-
tises. Andrea Palladio’s Four Books of Architecture (1570) and Vignola’s Regola delli cinque or-
dini d’architettura (Canon of the Five Orders of Architecture, 1562) moved away from an 
Alberti-treatise style to gain a more favorable chance of employability through print. Nonethe-
less, military engineering works had to be the most difficult to print based on these 
components.117 The pressure of getting employed was intense and military engineers had to 
overcome numerous obstacles to gain recognition for their artisan career. 
 One of the main obstacles between military engineers and the editori was the printing of 
illustrations and geometrical designs in paper for mass distribution. The mechanics of printing 
will not be discussed within this chapter, as works by Brian Richardson, Pamela O. Long, and 
Elizabeth Eisenstein have already detailed this intricate process.118 Illustrations were rare during 
the early cinquecento and were mostly printed by Albrecht Dürer (1471-1528). A man of multi-
ple vocations, Dürer converted to print production once he realized that being a painter, architect, 
and engineer was not a beneficial way to live. Dürer saw printing illustrations as the future after 
the height of the Italian Renaissance and produced 35 engravings and 90 woodcuts during his 
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career.119 His past vocational experiences gave Dürer the ability to print numerous fortification, 
geographical, and religious illustrations that reflected the ideologies of numerous occupations 
throughout the High Renaissance. Having a converted engineer produce fortification woodcuts 
and engravings brought hope to men like Michele da Sanmichele, Giulio Savorgnano, and Bar-
tolomeo Campi that their geometrical works and designs could be successfully converted to 
printed treatises.120 His woodcuts are intricate and it begs to wonder how a man could produce 
such vivid illustrations through a printing press. A few of his well-known prints are the Knight, 
Death, and the Devil, St. Jerome in His Study, and The Apocalypse. Dürer’s fortification works 
are printed in his 1527 Treatise on City Fortification with the untitled, [Design by Albrecht Dürer 
for 16th century fortification], The Siege of a Fortress,121 and On Fortification. All of these 
woodcuts show designs of trace italienne and how they could be implemented to a mass public 
across the European continent. With his death culminating the next year (1528), Dürer’s fortifica-
tion prints were introduced during the chaos of the Sack of Rome by the Holy Roman Emperor 
Charles V. The treatise by Dürer was printed during a mysterious gap, in which only a few 
printed fortification treatises appeared throughout the first half of the cinquecento.
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3.4. The Gap in Renaissance Printed Fortification Literature 
 Was the gap in printed fortification treatises a result of the Sack of Rome or from a 
heightened sense of the threat of plagiarism amongst fellow military engineers and editori from 
1527 to the 1560s? The answer to such a complex question could be yes, no, or both but more 
importantly: why? Any foreign invasion could freeze the manufacturing and distributing of 
printed materials within a particular city-state but would it halt the spread across an entire penin-
sula? In Renaissance War Studies, J.R. Hale has provided data that could possibly answer this. 
Before looking at this data, it must be noted that Venice was the most influential and productive 
city in the movement of printing literature across the Italian peninsula and Southern Europe. 
Only a few Italian city-states like Padua and Florence contributed to the massive fluctuation of 
print during the cinquecento. Rome, oddly enough, was not an influential center of print distribu-
tion, thus a foreign sacking would not entirely cripple the production of print throughout 
sixteenth-century Italy.122 Rome’s guidance on print culture was strong because of the influence 
of Popes Julius II and Leo X, but did not equal that of Venice. As mentioned before, Venice con-
trolled up to 150 printing shops throughout its borders and many of the best editori like Giunta, 
Antico, Petrucci, Scotto, and Gardano resided there.123 Iain Fenlon’s Panizzi Lectures notes that 
the Sack of Rome disrupted many of the normalities there. The sack crippled the city and most of 
the printing equipment disappeared as Imperial troops pillaged shops, homes, and palaces.124 The 
devastation affected Rome for years but printing quickly resumed once printer Valerio Dorico 
returned in 1529. His first printed work was Fabio Calvo’s Antique urbis Romae cum regionibus 
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Actual numbers from this data are mentioned and discussed later in this chapter. 
123  Fenlon, 15, 36. 
124  Ibid., 39. A more comprehensive work on the Sack of Rome in 1527 can be found in F. Gregorovius, The 
History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages (London, UK: 1894-1902).
simulachrum (1532), which was a Raphael-inspired diagram of a restored Rome.125 The direction 
that Italian printers followed did not benefit engineers in their search for patronage and recogni-
tion. Not one fortification treatise was published out of Rome until 1569, which was titled, Dis-
corsi di fortificationi under the Italian military architect Carlo Theti.126
 Venice became the authority for printed works on military affairs from 1492 to 1570. 
From this timespan, up to one hundred and forty-five treatises were strictly on military dealings, 
engagements, and strategies. Fifty-three of the treatises were printed originally by 46 different 
Venetian writers and thirty-two other writers lived outside of Venice. Out of those one hundred 
and forty-five published works, only nine were original titles dealing with fortification theory. 
Four dealt with fortification by mentioning artillery strategies and designs.127 To put this in per-
spective, Venice accounted for half of the total number of treatises and books that were produced 
in Italy, while Venetian printers produced half of the books in Italy.128 Was there a reason why so 
few fortification treatises were published from 1492 to 1570 during the age of cannons and trace 
italienne? The Sack of Rome did not stop printers from publishing works to a mass public, as 
demand for literacy was still prevalent. Venice, despite the Imperial takeover of Rome, still con-
ducted its print enterprise but chose not to focus its direct attention on military matters. By 1500, 
Venice had produced over two million copies of printed material over a population rate of fifty-
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neo’s Opera nuova di fortifcare... and Giovanni Battista Zanchi’s Del modo di fortificar le citta’...were the only Ital-
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128  Ibid., 430. Henri-Jean Martin traces this trend into early-17th century France in his Print, Power, and Peo-
ple. From 1601 to 1641, only three printed architectural works were present, with ten coming to prominence from 
1642 to 1670. Mathematical works numbered fourteen in the first half of the 17th century and twenty-one in the 
other half. Numerical growth was seen through more printed works in France than architectural/fortification works 
in Italy. Martin, 347.
five to sixty-million.129 Production might have been hindered due to the Sack of Rome but only 
slightly. The only fortification works by Venetian publishers were Galasso Alghisi’s Delle fortifi-
cazione libri tre (1570), Jacomo Lanteri’s Due dialoghi...del modo di disegnare le piante delle 
fortezze secondo Euclide (1557), and Girolamo Maggi and Fusto Castriotto’s joint treatise Della 
fortificatione della città libre tre (1564).130 The explanation for why Italian editori chose not to 
produce fortification treatises was due to engineers not being definitive in their theories along 
with a lack of demand from the mass populace.
3.5. Trust and Obey: Giorgio Vasari’s Relationship with Military Engineers 
 The reasons why engineers did not get their work published was a reflection of the inse-
curities and changing nature of their profession. Military engineers needed theoretical and 
groundbreaking designs to be considered relevant. To be employed was a top goal for engineers, 
and many had to trust other individuals to secure such aspirations. This trust had to be shared 
with other engineers, editori, officials at book fairs, and procuratori (agents) to gain patronage 
amongst elites and patrons. Trust in publishers was evident through men like Giorgio Vasari 
(1511-1571), who wrote Le Vite de' più eccellenti pittori, scultori, ed architettori da Cimabue 
insino a' tempi nostri (The Lives of the Most Eminent Painters, Sculptors, and Architects from 
Cimabue to Our Times), also known as Lives of the Artists.131 This multipart encyclopedia shares 
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131  Giorgio Vasari, trans. Gaston Du C. de Vere. Le Vite de' più eccellenti pittori, scultori, ed  Architettori da 
Cimabue insino a' tempi nostri (Lives of the Most Eminent Painters, Sculptors, and Architects), (New York: Harry 
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the relationships Vasari had with multiple artisans and engineers throughout the cinquecento. In 
many ways Vasari’s Le Vite is still being explored, as new research about these artisans emerges. 
These three volumes contain printed works by numerous military engineers like Giovanni Bat-
tista Bellucci (referred to as Giovan Battista San Marino by Vasari), Michele da Sanmicheli, and 
Leonardo da Vinci among others.
 Vasari’s role among military engineers was complex, as his writing suggests. For engi-
neers, having Vasari as a friend and confidant was troubling but necessary. Vasari was personally 
well-liked among multiple artisans but his job caused uneasiness and anxiety within the patron-
age realm. In knowing so many individuals, it must had been a daunting and exhaustive task to 
print treatises, woodcuts, and engravings to gain patronage for his fellow employees. Apprehen-
sion concerning fraud, plagiarism, and censorship haunted Vasari and his print enterprise. Self-
promotion was a key factor seen in Vasari’s prints as he helped escalate numerous artisans like 
Michelangelo, Michele da Sanmicheli, Giulio, and Rosso to employability among patrons and 
elites. The Lives of the Artists was another opportunity for engineers to gain publicity but at the 
discretion of what Vasari thought about them. For Bellucci, Vasari writes that:
I have judged that it would not be well to withhold what I have to say of him,...particularly in 
order to show that men of fine intellect, if only they be willing, succeed in everything, even if 
they set themselves late in life to difficult and honourable enterprises; for study, when added to 
natural inclination, has often been seen to accomplish marvellous things.132
Bellucci was viewed as an inspirational figure by Vasari. Bellucci did not receive fame for pub-
lished treatises but was viewed as a man of intellectual mastery among Italian society. Vasari 
continues to praise Bellucci by writing that he:
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deserves to be highly extolled, for the reason that, besides having been excellent in his profes-
sion, it is a marvelous thing that, having set himself to give attention to it late in life, at the age of 
thirty-five, he should have made in it the proficience that he did make; and it may be believed 
that if he had begun younger, he would have become a very rare master. Giovan Battista was 
something obstinate, so that it was a serious undertaking to  move him from any opinion.133
Vasari writes that Bellucci’s life was plagued by downfall but rose to become someone great. His 
wife died in 1541, which led to his two boys being raised alone by their unmotivated father. In 
his thirties, Bellucci decided to become an architect dealing with fortification design. This new 
stage of his life welcomed a man named Signor Gustamante, an Imperial Spaniard who had come 
to the Italian peninsula after the Sack of Rome. His services brought him into employment under 
Duke Cosimo I. Over the next ten years Bellucci undertook numerous fortification projects, 
while writing his book on earth centered fortifications. His work remained unpublished, residing 
with a Florentine friend named Messer Bernando Puccini.134 Bellucci gained creditability 
through his relationships, proving that engineers without publications can receive patron support 
during the cinquecento. 
 Engineers like Bellucci received opportunities for employment through individual rela-
tionships, not through printed material. Vasari’s Lives of the Artists helped bring the story of Bel-
lucci to an Italian society that knew very little of him in 1550, but Bellucci gained employability 
among aristocrats like Cosimo di Medici and Don Garza di Toledo before Vasari’s encyclopedia 
was published.135 Vasari’s Le Vite helped engineers who lived after 1550, describing engineer’s 
personal feelings and characteristics to patrons and elites across the peninsula. Michele San-
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and intimate relationships were during the age of Italian patronage. Printed works helped bring attention and detail 
to a particular cause but sometimes lacks the ability to bring the reader closer to the author. Dedications do help 
bring patrons together but knowing individuals personally always makes scenarios closer to the heart.
135  Vasari, 1566-67.
micheli was viewed by Vasari as “a man of upright life, and most honourable in every action. He 
was a cheerful person, yet with an admixture of seriousness...He was very liberal, and so courte-
ous with his friends, that they were as much masters of his possessions as he was himself.”136 
These were attributes that dear friends could describe, not mere business partners. Descriptions 
like these were just as beneficial to gaining employment as dedicating a printed work to a par-
ticular patron or magistrate. It is relationships like these with Bellucci and Sanmicheli that make 
reliable trust with printers either an enjoyable enterprise or a nervous venture of backstabbing 
and perpetual anxiety. 
 It was important to establish relationships between editori and military engineers but 
some tensions between the two vocations were not entirely of their making. The Protestant Ref-
ormation and the Wars of Religion produced multiple tensions among policentrismos and print 
centers across sixteenth-century Europe. Henri-Jean Martin’s Print, Power, and People in 17th 
Century France presents a short synopsis of how print became censured and inspected during the 
early cinquecento.137 Huge amounts of printed works were distributed throughout the early six-
teenth century but stagnated as original works began to wither and re-editions of classics 
emerged. Religious entities started to take over print in the mid-1550s and placed censures 
through the Council of Trent, the Ten “General Principles,” and offices that oversaw the inspec-
tion of all books going through presses.138 There were many city-states, territories, and princi-
palities that viewed these regulations differently but focus will remain on Venice because of its 
influential role throughout the Italian peninsula.
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3.6. Apprehension and Uneasiness amongst Military Engineers 
 Print censorship in Venice was demanding, frustrating, and daunting. Limitations on 
printing was reinforced through the Venetian Senate and the Holy Office, which made all printers 
own a license to publish. Privileges among artisans were revoked and in 1562 the Venetian State 
introduced its own procedures, which put censorship and prohibition at the forefront of the print 
enterprise. A list of banned books would circulate across the Venetian territories and owners of 
such works would be stripped of their licenses. To ensure legality of a new work, every manu-
script had to be read by the clergy and two laymen. Each had to testify that the work did not have 
“anything against religion, or against princes, or any good customs.”139 Two manuscripts had to 
be printed for each legal work, which came out of the printer’s budget if not under a patron. This 
process took one to three months and the editori had to pay the clergy and laymen to read their 
works before the printing process.140 The exercise was exhaustive and many writers decided not 
to partake of print for fear of being punished. Despite the decision to print or not, “by the end of 
the sixteenth century, the idea of profiting directly from writing was widely accepted as perfectly 
natural and respectable.”141 
 Heated engagements between engineers were few but mainly caused by disloyalty. J.R. 
Hale, Simon Pepper, Christopher Duffy, and Horst de la Croix have reiterated through their par-
ticular research that Francesco di Giorgio was the first to “engage” trace italienne.142 Giorgio’s 
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man Inquisition. Without notice, officials from the Holy Office would go into bookshops and presses to inspect cer-
tain works as counterfeit and unlawful. An Inquisitional seal was put on works for sale and redistribution. Bethen-
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141  Richardson, 101.
142  de la Croix, “Military Architecture and the Radial City,” 275.
Trattato I & II claim him as the patriarchal leader of bastion design and presents counterfeit arti-
sans as “crows dressed in feathers of the peacock.” He claims that, “all which is contained in this 
my little work” is “of my own invention.”143 This defense by di Giorgio is very much like Vitru-
vius’ back in Antiquity. His hopes were that, “his own lack of fame and reputation would be 
remedied by his treatise [De architectura].”144 According to de la Croix, the 1570 controversial 
duel between Galasso Alghisi and Jacopo Fusto Castriotto was considered one of the strongest 
cases of print plagiarism and theft. In Delle fortificationi libri tre, Alghisi accused Castriotto of 
stealing his fortification geometrical “idea,” which was the stellated polygon.145 Resembling a 
starred-shaped structure, this fortification style was just an addition to Antonio da Sangallo the 
Younger’s star based bastion design which came to prominence during the early years of the 
cinquecento.146 Printers were unaware that Alghisi had come up with the “stellated polygon” at 
the presses. Honestly, most printers did not care about stolen “ideas” as long as they were paid 
and their chances at patronage were increased. It was not the job of the editori to find out who 
claimed ownership of particular fortification ideas.147 In the harshest sense, engineers who gave 
their intellectual theories and designs to printers first were considered the authority on trace ital-
ienne. 
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 The written fight ended with Alghisi blaming the Rome conferences for letting so many 
minds come together to discuss their theoretical ideas amongst each other.148 Multiple intellec-
tual conferences were put together by Pope Paul III to help bring the best fortification theories to 
the service of Rome. Alghisi, Bellucci, Castriotto, di Marchi, Laparelli, Sanmichele, and many 
other military engineers were present at these conferences. Many of these military engineers 
viewed Giovanni Battista Bellucci’s last years of his life as full of deception and lacking direc-
tion. Vasari mentions that Bellucci secretly took the fortification ground-plans of Siena and gave 
them to “the Lord Duke and to the Marchese di Marignano,” so that they could easily invade the 
city.149 His fraudulent actions were rewarded by the magistrates by naming him captain of three 
hundred foot-soldiers.150 Bellucci and the Marchese used these men to siege Siena, which ended 
horribly for Bellucci. A harquebus ball ended the life of Bellucci in March 1554. The last acts of 
Bellucci did not represent the core of military engineers during the cinquecento. Vasari viewed 
him as an outstanding architect but realized that he let the pressures of employability get to him. 
He saw employability as a means to an end, even if it meant being a spy for the Imperial army. 
This scenario illustrates the extent to which engineers would go to be profitably employed. 
3.7. In Conclusion: Swinging Doors
 Except for a few military engineers, many decided to gain patronage and vocational pres-
tige by having their written drawings and theories printed by the editori. One could either obey 
the rules and exhaustive measures to get their work published or create for themselves a reputa-
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tion that would gain them credibility through intimate relationships. Roger Chartier describes 
this world of the military engineer by mentioning that, “authors do not write books: they write 
texts that become written objects.”151 Print censorship was a demand that could be taken by mor-
tal individuals, policentrismos, institutions, and by God Himself. To lay claim to an “idea” was a 
difficult task, especially in a world which thrived off new and innovative directions and ideals. 
Many artisans faced unforeseen difficulties, resulting in apprehension, feelings of deception, and 
thoughts of betrayal by contemporaries, printers, and patrons. Italian society changed rapidly 
throughout the cinquecento, with new professions, inventions, and enterprises coming to promi-
nence throughout the peninsula. Paths to vocational notability and prestige were unlocked for 
military engineers, depending on which doors they chose to venture through during their time on 
earth. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION
 This thesis focuses on military engineers who influenced the discombobulated city-states 
of the Italian peninsula. Italy is largely viewed by historians as the undisputed origin of trace 
italienne.152 I strongly agree and do not wish to refute this statement in any way possible. It is in 
Italy where the first families of military engineers started to construct bastions of trace italienne.  
The introduction to this thesis lays out the groundwork for past and present scholarship on the 
“military revolution,” Renaissance vocations, military technologies, scientific discoveries, and 
print culture. Careful research over the past fifty years has contributed to the advancement of this 
thesis in particular. The field of military history has undergone a structural change from within, 
presenting itself as more open to other sub-disciplines of historical scholarship. Integrating scien-
tific and technological studies has provided historians, like myself, with the opportunity to ex-
pand traditional histories. By focusing on specific vocations like High Renaissance military en-
gineers, new visions and intellectual theories can be explored. There is still very much to gain 
from primary sources that have been available for centuries. One needs to only include other sub-
fields of history to create such new scholarship. 
 The first complete chapter of the thesis, “Men who could Balance Defense against At-
tack,” dealt with the difficult acquisition and transferring of knowledge (trace italienne) within 
the Italian city-states. This included the overwhelming desire for hired military engineers among 
Italian principalities and how their individuality changed due to the evolution of Italian society. 
Furthermore, the acceptance and/or rejection of trace italienne was reflected through three case 
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studies which involved Florence, Bologna, and Venice. These three scenarios displayed the 
evolving demand of military engineers throughout the cinquecento. Engineers were generally 
sought out as individuals who could envision and carry out trace italienne fortifications by them-
selves. Over the course of the sixteenth century, Italian societies hired military engineers in con-
glomeration with other professions to construct bastioned fortifications and radial cities. No 
longer did military engineers become the sole representative of a fortification project and this 
evolution was addressed explicitly. 
 The second complete chapter, “Crows Dressed in Peacock Feathers,” took the thread of 
the thesis through anxieties and challenges associated with print, censorship, and patronage 
within cinquecento Italy. The inner desire for prestige and wealth, along with its limitations, was 
researched in conjunction with contemporary plagiarism. Few military engineers wanted a cul-
ture of sharing among peers but many feared fraudulence and the stealing of intellectual theories 
and designs.This uneasiness contributed to a lack of printed material dealing with fortifications 
during the first half of the cinquecento, therefore escalating after the Sack of Rome in 1527. It 
was not until the end of the cinquecento that a dominant surge could be seen in printing fortifica-
tion manuscripts. Military engineers Giovanni Bellucci, Michel Sanmicheli, Francesco di Gior-
gio, and numerous editori were brought together within case studies to illustrate the decline and 
prominent rise of fortification print demand. 
 Much work is still required to provide a complete picture of the military engineer’s influ-
ential impact upon war and society. The character and determination of these men deserves to be 
recognized as immediate contributors to the advancement of human civilization. Further studies 
could expand toward areas outside of Italy. France, England, the Netherlands, and the Americas 
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face similar challenges associated with gunpowder weaponry and ballistic technology. Research 
concerning the outside influences of trace italienne have been tackled by historians like Jeremy 
Black and Geoffrey Parker but have yet to focus entirely on the role of military engineers within 
these geographic areas. It is to be hoped that this thesis has contributed to new and innovative 
ways of perceiving vocational professions within early modern society. 
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